CORRESPONDENCE
The following are responses to Professor Duncan Kennedy's article,
The Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School Curriculum, which appears at page one of this volume. Professor Kennedy's
reply to Professor Gellhorn's criticism has been reprinted at page
1085.
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM: A REPLY TO KENNEDY
Chris Langdell*
Duncan Kennedy's article, The Political Significance of the
Structure of the Law School Curriculum,I performs an important
service. Not that I agree with Kennedy's program-far from it. But
Kennedy is to be commended for reviving the debate about curriculum-a debate which, ultimately, confronts us with the question of
what is the proper role of American legal education in the last quarter
of the twentieth century.
I will state my value premise explicitly: The purpose of a law
school education is to train lawyers. Note that I don't claim that the
purpose of law school is to train lawyers. Law schools may have other
functions-for example, their professors may engage in various forms
of scholarship that at best have a remote relationship with training
lawyers. These may well be legitimate functions for a law school. My
premise is limited to legal education, by which I mean classroom
discussion, homework assignments, and the various devices (examinathat distintions, papers, grading, and professors' recommendations)
2
guish "good" students from "average" students.
In saying that the function of a legal education is to train lawyers, I don't mean to deny the force of Kennedy's charge that this
function has "political" content. Of course it does. We cannot train
lawyers to practice in our legal system without inculcating, to some
degree, the shared values of that system. That the typical student
emerges from law school with a healthy respect for the adversary
system and the rule of law is hardly surprising; nor is it unsettling to
find these values coupled with acceptance of the culture's prevailing
political norms. The extent of a law school curriculum's contribution
* Chris Langdell (a pen name) teaches at University of Chicago Law School. He would like
to thank Richard A. Posner, Geoffrey R. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein, Mary E. Becker, Douglas G.
Baird, and Daniel R. Fischel for helpful comments.
14 SEroN HALL L. REV. 1 (1983).
We no longer seem to have "bad" students.
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to this process is debatable, but it doubtless does have some "socializing" influence on many young lawyers.
Where I differ with Kennedy is that I am not too troubled by
this. Our culture has accepted that lawyers are the agents of the rule
of law. As "officers of the court," they are charged with aiding and
abetting the law-making and law-applying functions of judges and
quasi-judicial officials such as administrative boards or arbitrators.
Lawyers never have been, and never will be, the causes of social
evolution. They may, at times, be the agents of change, but only in
their capacity as representatives of clients. And even where lawyers do
further the process of change-as illustrated most dramatically by
their role in the civil rights movement-their major contribution is
conservative in spirit: They channel political disputes into the legal/
political process, where disagreements can be resolved through the
rule of law rather than through force and arms. If civil rights lawyers
had not been successful in the courts and the political branches, we
doubtless would have seen some of our disputes resolved on the streets
in a considerably less amicable manner.
So I say unabashedly that the function of legal education is to
train students to be good lawyers in an adversary system. We are
successful to the extent that we make our students wiser and more
creative counsellors to their clients in transacting the affairs of home
or business, and better and more vigorous advocates of their clients'
interests when disputes arise.
If this is, indeed, the proper function of legal education, how
effective have we been at meeting that challenge? I believe we could
do a much better job than we have heretofore. As Professor Kennedy
rightly observes, the traditional curricula at law schools today reflects
a basic "core" of common law subjects, surrounded by a "periphery"
of other subjects, mostly arising out of the New Deal enthusiasms of
the generation of law school professors now retiring. To this we have
recently added a smattering of courses entitled "Law and
""Law and Economics," "Law and Anthropology," "Law and Literature," etc. These courses have provided a sometimes important view
of the law from the standpoint of another discipline, 3 but they have
not accomplished anything like a fundamental re-examination of the
law school curriculum.

3 The Law and Economics movement, in particular, has had an immense and beneficial
influence in legal scholarship.
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If we examine the typical law school curriculum afresh, and
apply our standard that the function of legal education is to train good
lawyers, two glaring shortcomings emerge. First, we pay almost no
attention to the lawyer's role as it influences the legal system. Second,
we fail to provide even minimally adequate instruction in vast areas of
substantive law that are tremendously important to practicing lawyers.
It is a remarkable feature of current legal education that we
spend hundreds of hours examining the courts as social institutions,
but almost no time examining the institution of the bar. Indeed, the
typical law school course assumes lawyers out of existence. Judicial
opinions are evaluated in terms of the judge's craftsmanship, reasoning powers, or social philosophy. All kinds of other influences on
judicial decisions are also studied-except, ironically, the one which
ought to be closest to a law school's heart: the influence of its graduates on judicial behavior. Yet, if we think lawyers are significant in
the litigation process, we must believe that a lawyer's advocacy is
often the most important influence on a judge's decision.
The implicit model of a lawyer conveyed in law school classes is
that of a cipher whose influence on the growth and development of
law is purely secular. Lawyers, to the extent that their influence is
acknowledged at all, are viewed as perfect agents of their clients. The
fact that a lawyer's interests may deviate substantially from the client's is rarely mentioned. Students at many law schools spend three
years learning about doctrine without once hearing their professors
acknowledge that lawyers work for a fee. Yet attorneys' fees and
agency problems between lawyer and client have had the most profound influence on the nature and shape of our legal system.
Surely the personal injury litigation explosion, and the oftennoted increase in litigiousness generally in our society, has some relationship to the growth of contingency fee arrangements or to the
increase in the number of lawyers per capita. Class actions and shareholders derivative suits, which have so significantly influenced the
legal system in recent years, have as their sine qua non the common
fund/common benefit exception to the American rule on attorneys' fee
shifting. And in the many substantive areas where Congress or state
legislatures have enacted plaintiff-favoring fee statutes, lawyers have
been given the incentive to try out ever more "creative" legal theories,
with important consequences for the development of substantive law
in these areas.
Even when lawyers are acknowledged to exist and to act as the
imperfect agents of clients, law is not recognized to be a craft. The
concept of a craft implies a notion of tolerances: the point is to do the
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job adequately and at the lowest cost in time or money. A potter who
takes a year to make a pot may be a good artist; she is not a good
craftsman. A lawyer who takes a year to write a brief may be an
excellent scholar; she is not a good lawyer.
Law schools emphatically do not teach their students that one of
the primary skills of a good lawyer is a finely-developed sense of
tolerances. To the contrary, heavy emphasis is placed on "thoroughness": A law student is penalized severely for missing a denial of
certiorari in a case citation or failing to produce perfectly proofread
copy. It is considered virtuous to read every single case in an area;
reading only a few or (worse yet) relying on secondary sources is
disparaged. The prevailing ethos is reinforced by the institution of
Law Review, the symbol of law school success, which makes a fetish
out of the most nitpicking care in the research, editing, and presentation of articles and notes.
Students learn about tolerances, not through explicit law school
instruction, but rather through figuring out how to "beat" the law
school system by reading Emanuel law outlines, obtaining old syntheses of professors' courses, footnoting the "right" sorts of citations in
written work, and so on. This may be an effective, if inadvertent,
teaching method, but it conveys exactly the wrong message to the
student-it says that giving the optimal amount of effort to a legal
task is some sort of shady corner-cutting, rather than the proper
attitude for a lawyer to take if she is sincerely interested in the best
interests of her client.
The second major shortcoming of contemporary curricula is their
failure to cover vast and important areas of contemporary legal practice. Students emerge from law school with some capacity, probably,
to write a contract or try a personal injury case. But the legal practices
of many law school graduates have nothing to do with these matters.
Large firm practice today is highly specialized. Practitioners are immensely skilled in sophisticated, technical areas of the law. And their
practices tend to be highly industry-specific-they deal almost exclusively with clients in a single, broad line of business.
Most law school graduates are woefully unprepared for this type
of practice. The sad fact is that even minimally adequate courses are
simply not offered in most specialized areas. Thousands of lawyers can
and do spend their entire professional lives in areas such as energy
law, international trade, telecommunications, insurance regulation,
banking, utilities, pension and health benefit plans, transportation,
housing, water and air pollution, welfare, and charitable organiza-

1984]

CORRESPONDENCE

1081

tions. Yet rare indeed is the law school that offers courses in more than
4
a few of these important areas.
Most of these areas, of course, implicate concepts that are taught
in the traditional course curriculum-antitrust, corporations, contracts, etc. Thus it could be argued that these courses are essentially
unnecessary, or at least expendable, because they simply recombine
elements that are taught elsewhere. But the fact is that all these
courses present unique and important issues. To the extent that they
put together concepts learned elsewhere, they do so in new ways that
add greatly to the student's understanding.
It could also be argued that law schools are simply not equipped
to teach in these areas. Such courses require that professors become
familiar with arcane, complex, and rapidly evolving legal landscapes-areas a practitioner could spend a life in and not know fully.
A law school-especially a smaller law school-simply does not have
the luxury of allowing professors to specialize this heavily. Also, these
courses may demand a knowledge of specific industries that is outside
the competence of some law professors or law libraries.
But not being able to specialize in everything doesn't mean a law
school can't specialize in a Jew things. More of these courses could be
offered; and students might be encouraged to take advanced courses
at other schools if a particular course were not available at their
institution. And the industry-specific problem could be alleviated in
many cases by closer association between law and business schools.
In the final analysis, both of these problems-the lack of adequate attention to lawyers as a social institution and the failure to
offer important substantive courses-probably stem from the same
root cause: the gulf between law schools and law practice. Most law
professors either know nothing of practice or have forgotten what they
once knew. The professoriat tends to dismiss the practicing bar as
narrow and unreflective; the bar, for its part, thinks of law teachers as
unrealistic and uninformed. 5 My proposal, I suppose, is partly intended to narrow this gulf between theory and practice-to achieve,
in some small measure, what Duncan Kennedy might call "praxis."

4 The specialized areas where we do have courses-securities, labor law, etc.-were mostly
introduced by the New Deal era generation of professors. But new courses have not been created
as other statutory areas of the law have become important in legal practice.
5 This is not, of course, to say that individual practitioners or lawyers do not maintain close
contacts with the other side of the profession.
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February 13, 1984
Mr. Kevin H. Marino
Seton Hall Law Review
Seton Hall University School of Law
Newark, N.J. 07102
Dear Mr. Marino:
I have just read Professor Duncan Kennedy's paper, "The Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School Curriculum," in
your vol.14, no.1. I realize that it is simply a replaying of Professor
Kennedy's talk at the University of Victoria, and that it does not have
the fine tuning one might expect in a serious law review article. Some
of the paper's theses are, however, related to imprecise representations
of the past and seem to me to be doubtfully worthy of an "intellectual
movement" the Kennedy paper is meant to advance.
I will start with administrative law. Professor Kennedy asserted
at the bottom of page 3 that it "came into existence as a result of the
creation of the regulatory welfare state. There was no meaningful
body of administrative law in any of the English-speaking countries
until the creation of the welfare state, with its public assistance programs and its manifold different modes of intervention in economic
life." This is inexact. As shown in the opening pages of my book
Federal Administrative Proceedings, published in 1941, the use of
administrative officers has been a response to "felt governmental
problems" ever since 1789, when the Constitution became operative.
Professor Kennedy then declared that Constitutional Law as an
academic discipline emerged only "as part of the critique of rightwing invalidation of leftist social legislation, and is sustained today by
nostalgia for the Warren Court." Of course when the author said that
to a Canadian audience he may have intended merely to elicit some
chuckles and perhaps he even succeeded in doing so. In any case, he
was badly mistaken concerning the facts. Constitutional Law as an
academic discipline long antedated Lochner v. New York and its ilk.
Professor Kennedy may have been right in saying that no courses
in taxation were taught until after the First World War. He was
wrong, though, in saying that no courses in Administrative Law
existed until "between about 1930 and about 1950." Here at Columbia Frank Goodnow was a teacher of major consequence in that
particular area of the law for thirty years before he became president
of Johns Hopkins University in 1914. At Chicago Ernst Freund was
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writing and teaching before World War I, let alone before 1930. I
have small doubt that an historian of legal education, which I am not,
would provide other illustrations; I mention only two of the persons
who were influential not only in my youth, but before my youth.
When Administrative Law received expanded attention-and I do
agree that that occurred after the subject became headline news because of some judges' resistance to somewhat innovative statutes-it
was not taught or propagated "openly and explicitly by young liberal
faculty members who thought that they were an enormously important part of the curriculum for the simple reason that they embodied
the new wave of social legislation." I was one of the "young liberal
faculty members" of that period and I daresay that my Administrative
Law teaching materials, first published in 1940, had something to do
with the shape given the course in some law schools other than my
own. I do not think that I regarded myself as an "enormously important part of the curriculum," and assuredly not for the reason Professor Kennedy stated. I thought Administrative Law was important
then (and still do think it) because persons outside the government are
significantly affected by determinations of both an adjudicatory and
rulemaking and general policy nature made by administrators rather
than by judges, who had previously been the major focus of attention
of legal educators. I believe that the administrative process was and is
worthy of study; and I think so wholly without reference to the
particular subject matters or the particular policy emphases that may
be involved.
The Kennedy paper sometimes makes points by the sparkling
nature of its assertions rather than by accuracy of revelation. Thus,
for example, page 6 declares that "the legal process orientation was
initially designed to show that there is a role for each legal institution
in a global overall plan to maximize welfare through reform, and that
the courts should cooperate with rather than obstruct that program."
I do not think that that was at all the point of the Hart & Sacks Legal
Process Materials (1958), said by Professor Kennedy to be the "best
known formulation." Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks were
showing that sometimes one uses an axe and sometimes a knife and
sometimes scissors to cut; one can not choose the most suitable cutting
instrument or the most suitable "legal process" without first understanding the task to be accomplished and the materials at hand. The
authors to whom Professor Kennedy referred talked about such things
as means of resolving controversies about the quality of perishable
commodities, an issue that might embroil a shipper and a consignee in
angry dispute. Was a suit at law the best instrument that man could
design for dealing with that sort of conflict, or could something else be
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done? That has nothing at all to do, in my estimation, with "a global
overall plan to maximize welfare through reform" nor does it necessarily result in the conclusion that "courts should cooperate with
rather than obstruct ...... Very possibly, analysis of a problem in the
Hart and Sacks style would show that the courts were precisely the
best organ fitted to inquiring and deciding. Messrs. Hart and Sacks
were simply showing that one needed to be concerned with function,
not with a preconceived "right way of doing things." That is very
different from the Kennedy characterization.
In sum, Professor Kennedy's assertedly descriptive comments and
characterizations corresponded only slightly with what I have myself
observed. In the law school I know best, I doubt that any classroom
emphasizes "the memorization of a list of rules," as the paper asserts
happens elsewhere. The prevailing purpose of modern legal education
is to help students learn how to learn. Good students tend also to be
skeptical and non-accepting persons, ready to reexamine presuppositions, their own as well as others'. Acceptance of ex cathedra pronouncements (or their academic equivalents) is indeed rare. Indoctrination is not easily accomplished, even if attempted, because a law
school worthy of notice embraces too broad a range of opinions (or, of
opinionated persons, both professors and students) to make for declaration or acceptance of the "one true faith." Not invariably, but for
the most part, law professors seek to identify what is relevant to a
problem under consideration and to describe realistically, rather than
hyperbolically or whimsically, the available factual information. Few
of those whom I happen to know and know to be generally well
regarded are hermeneuticists or phenomenologists who, as Professor
Kennedy says, engage in a "high-flown, mystificatory Dance of the
Big Words designed more to establish the choreographer's prestige
than to communicate with the audience." His vision of what legal
education and legal educators should be may be right, but I believe he
misperceives what they in fact are.
Sincerely yours,
s/s Walter Gellhorn

WG/cl
cc: Professor Kennedy
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Duncan Kennedy replies:
I was way off in asserting that there were no courses in Administrative Law until the 1930's, and I'm grateful to Professor Gellhorn
for pointing that out. But I don't think his other criticisms hold
water.
Of course, I agree that our government has used administrative
officers ever since 1789. The question I was addressing was the emergence of what could rightfully be called a major body of law, an
interrelated complex of doctrines occupying a significant spot in the
corpus juris of a given period. Administrative law didn't achieve that
status in this country until the 20th century. See generally W. Chase,
The American Law School & The Rise of Administrative Government
23-59 (1982).
I say in the paper that young administrative law teachers in the
1930's thought their subject important at least in part because it dealt
with the legal form of the New Deal legislation that was supposed to
transform American laissez-faire capitalism. It would be hard to read
Louis Jaffe's article, Law Making By Private Groups, 51 Harv. L.
Rev. 201 (1937), for example, without getting this impression.
A reader of Professor Gellhorn's 1935 article, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 679, gets a quite different sense of the
author than that conveyed in the bloodless portrait he paints of himself in his letter. See also W. Chase, supra, at 136-47, and especially
145 (discussing Professor Gellhorn's article, Stone on Administrative
Law, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 735 (1946)).
I think Professor Gellhorn is wrong about the origins of constitutional law as an academic subject. Before the 1890's, there were a few
large black letter treatises-Story, Rawle, Sedgwick, Cooley-written
mostly by judges and practitioners, but no extensive scholarly literature, let alone a body of books. The subject was debated in judicial
opinions. In the '90's, law teachers began to create a periodical literature, epitomized by Thayer's pathbreaking article on judicial review,
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893) (citing almost exclusively to opinions). This literature centered from the beginning on the role of the
federal courts in relation to social legislation and labor injunctions.
As for the legal process orientation, a reader of pages 110 to 206
of the Hart & Sacks materials, H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process
110-206 (tent. ed. 1958), will find ample support for my assertion that
those authors were concerned to define dovetailing roles for different
legal institutions, with a view to welfare maximization.
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The notion that the "prevailing purpose of modern legal education is to help students learn how to learn," along with the corollaries
Professor Gellhorn draws about what legal education is like, strike me
as pious hopes rather than as descriptions of reality. Would that it
were so.

